Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

In a chronological way and with support from literary sources, this paper looks upon the most important theories developed in attention to satire, since Antiquity to our days. It is a critical view on these authors who, across history, had expressed relevant ideas or elaborated theoretical models about satiric literature; this, with the intention of precise a comprehensive analitic frame to aproximate to particular works of this type.

Review of Patricia Marín Cepeda (ed.), "En la concha de venus amarrado": erotismo y literatura en el Siglo de Oro.

Review of José J. Labrador Herraiz (coord.), Segunda parte de la Silua de varios romances.

Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of observer memories.  On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including memory experiences.  On the other hand, he argues that in observer memories there is no additional explicit representation of oneself experiencing the event: the self-presence is transparent and given by the mode of presentation.  Whereas these are two lines of strategic and original argumentation, they are not exempt of problems.  In this critical notice, I focus on the problematic aspects of McCarroll’s account.  I show that it presents some issues that affect the internal coherence of the overall framework, and that some aspects and central notions would have needed more development to offer a precise picture of the nature of observer memories.

Aestheticism and moralism are two vices in which aesthetic or moral values are overrated in situations where other values are at stake and should also be taken into account, but are underrated. Carlos Pereda maintains that they are pathologies of judgment and argues that literature has been the victim of different variants of these vices. To do this, he distinguishes between different forms of aestheticism and moralism, and analyzes how some of them have implications at the semantic and communication levels. Pereda proposes a “reflective model” that counteracts the simplification that these pathologies represent. In this note, I critically examine Pereda’s theory and propose other ways that the analysis of aestheticism and moralism can take.

This paper analyses the two main thesis of the recently published Manuel Pérez Otero’s book Vericuetos de la filosofía de Wittgenstein: the revision of the general symmetry between actions and omissions as intentional behaviour, and the proposal of a teleological (etiological) dispositional answer to Kripke’s Wittgenstein sceptical challenge about meaning. Concerning the first thesis, we show that the grammar of the attributions of intentions is neutral regarding causal determinism stressing the retrospective character implied by concept of a “justification post hoc”. Regarding the second thesis, we stress that the refusal of internism is not enough to make of teleological dispositions a satisfactory explanation of behaviour. We try to clarify the kind of problem posed by the Kripke’s Wittgenstein meaning scepticism: to abandon the conception that makes of “rule-following” the “praxis of a subject” for another that regards rule-followers as the “subjects of a practice”.

In past years, several substructural solutions to semantical paradoxes have been developed. In particular, nontransitive, nocontractive, nonmonotonic and nonreflexive theories have been proposed. However, when such a solutions are presented using sequent-calculi it emerges what I call the problem of the dependence. In a nutshell, this problem consists in that it’s not easy (or sometimes even possible) to distinguish between the structural rules and the other rules of the calculus. In this article, I will present in detail this problem and I show that even worst there is a calculus such that doesn’t contain any structural rule but cannot nontrivially handle semantical vocabulary. Finally, I will delimit this problem and I will conclude that the correct methodology for preferring one specific substructural theory should be based on philosophical arguments (or in some case, on empirical bases), but not in the comparison between calculi.

Traditional interpretations of Frege’s philosophy usually explain his anti-psychologism as an indication that subjectivism must not interfere in the elaboration of logical language, yet such interpretations run into serious difficulties when attempting to account for how much Frege himself emphasizes concepts such as assertive force. This essay attempts to solve this quandary by investigating some of Frege’s epistemological ideas, beginning with his concept of science. This will lead to the conclusion that an understanding of truth as an essentially public phenomenon can solve this and other interpretative dilemmas.

The barcode image has been imposed to refer to a mitochondrial DNA sequence that is used to measure the genetic distance between animal populations. According to the essentialist interpretation of this analogy, this measurement method would serve not only for the rapid identification of specimens or fragmentary samples of previously classified species, but also, by itself, for the discovery of new species. Integrative taxonomists have rejected this latter use of the DNA barcode method, since biological complexity precludes its precise application in recent speciation events. I will argue, however, that the method fails for conceptual and not merely empirical reasons. Even if it wouldn’t have any empirical impediment, the DNA barcode could not be a method of species discovery.