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This article presents and analyzes the arguments –as well as their logical-mathematical presuppositions– that ground the speculative realism of Markus Gabriel and Quentin Mei-llassoux. It is argued that both rely on a particular and narrow understanding of logics and mathematics fundamentally indebted to Badiou’s claim that speculative philosophy is only possible in the language of mathematics and, within it, the language of set-theory.In the article I show the limitations of set-theory derived from classic paradoxes, but also when confronted with category theory. As it is well-known, the later contests the privilege of the former as a theory to ground the whole of mathematics. I offer arguments in favor of a category-theory based ontology rather that set-theory. At the same time, I present realist arguments stemming from Schelling’s philosophy, trying to harmonize it with a categorical framework.

Well-known sociologist, a most prolific writer in the field of political theory, pol-emology, history, epistemology and methodology of social sciences, Julien Freund was, however, first and foremost philosopher. Nevertheless, his philosophy has received little attention from specialists yet. We intend to show in this article the relevance of this phi-losophical approach to reading all the work of this French author, and how he conceived his dedication to social sciences as a mediation to a broader framework of understanding permanent problems of human existence, i.e.: a rational mediation to metaphysics.

The purpose of this work is to clarify Fichte’s interpretation of the Identity Principle in the Jena version of his Wissenschaftslehre, assuming his epistemological constructi-vism, and contrasting it with Aristotle’s classic interpretation. The focus is on the first section of the first part of the text, in which he sets forth his Absolutely Unconditioned Principle, as it is there where he first introduces the Identity Principle. First, Fichte’s exposition of his fundamental first principle is followed, explaining the use of the Iden-tity Principle in his argumentation. Second, an analysis is made of his treatment of this principle. Third, this treatment is contrasted with the epistemic nature of the principle in the classic interpretation. Finally, some similarities and differences between both inter-pretations are highlighted.

Being a peculiar thinker and understood as an out-sider, Lev Shestov is the creator of a philosophy that, continuing the work of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard or Dostoievki, among others, comes to break for rebuild; this means that he creates a thought shaped by his Jewish roots, Russian culture as well as the philosophy and the religion, accompanied by a critical view through which he manages to lay the foundations of a philosophy with a tragic sense that opposes all speculative and positivist thinking. For Shestov, scientism, positivism and philosophy, reduced themselves to an abstract thinking, represent a threat to separate human beings from their tragic destiny, from their consciousness of finitu-de, as well as from faith itself, limiting philosophical thinking to abstractions that do not respond to the fundamental questions of existence. In these pages I intend to analyze this philosophical universe of the Shestovian tradition with the aim of highlighting the importance of rescuing a thinker like him, in the context of the increasingly reductionist philosophical thinking of our time.

An Inquiry concerning the State (Eine Untersuchung über den Staat) is the last of four  “phenomenological” writings that Edith Stein (1891-1942) composed before becoming a Catholic in 1922.  The work contains Stein’s political philosophy and theory of the state and appeared in the phenomenological journal Jahr­buch für Philosophie und phä­no­­menologische Forschung in 1925.  Her analyses are not only important theoretically; they also cast light on the political movements of her time (Adolf Hitler´s Mein Kampf was published in the same year) and indeed are quite relevant to the social turmoil and ideological controversies we are experiencing today.  The following is a sketch of Stein’s life and intellectual activity and a review of main topics she treats in work: state and community, sovereignty, people and nation, law, morality and religion.

In this contribution, we expound the concept of person that A. J. Ayer developed in The Concept of a Person (1963). The goal of this exposition is twofold: on the one hand, we pretend to show one aspect of Ayer’s philosophy that is not as popular as others of his; and on the other, we attempt to recover a mental experiment that may be interesting for the contemporary debate about the nature of persons.

The main theme of this essay is the problematization of the concept of natural attitude (na-türliche Einstellung), as a moment of the multiple possibilities for the manifestation of the being. In Die Idee der Phänomenologie Husserl adopts the so-called “Cartesian way” –one of those that remain in Ideen I of 1913, in the Erste Philosophie course of 1923/23, and in the Cartesianische Medi-tationen of 1929– towards the fulfillment of a first reduction of the pure ego, non-psychological, where it is redirected to an absolute identification with the temporary flow of its experien-ces. However, although the problem of the constitution of the natural attitude is not thematic for Husserl until the mid 20’s and 30’s, with the introduction of the problem of the “Weltans-chauung” (worldview) as a mode of donation originating from the natural world, where man is constituted in a natural attitude, in this work we maintain that the inclusion of his meaning in the phenomenological analysis of transcendence is possible. It’s initial guiding thread will be the first lesson in Die Idee der Phänomenologie which later will give way to some reflections that belong to the same genre of problems. This will be the attempt to elucidate the relevance of the natural attitude as an ontological category of intentionality and at the same time as a testimony of the problems about temporality and the possibility to begin in philosophy.

This article does not propose to explain the theoretical approach and practice of Ber-nard Lassus but it aims to redraw its genesis. At the heart of the ”demeasurable”, the qua-lity of landscape to extend itself further than its real surface, the article proposes through a movement playing between the experiences and concepts, which lead to an open piece, to follow the career of this singular landscaper. This text reminds that landscape eludes every definition. Constituted with the interrelations of its component elements, the landscape, or better ”a” landscape refers to the hypothesis that the perception raises on the environment. Based on the fundamental experience on light, color and visibility of the objects, referring to the practice of perception and imagination, Bernard Lassus has elaborated the concepts of trams, belvedere or minimal intervention. Then, fulfilled by new visual and tactile ex-perimentations and by the development of a sort of vernacular landscapist and its actors ”landscaper Inhabitant”, his concepts have again evolved. These evolutions lead Bernard Lassus to express his personal conception of landscape project, the aesthetic and the im-portant ethical character of it. The article concludes on what should be a public policy on landscape, in order to be authentically democratic.

The following paper reflects on the interpretation conducted by M. Heidegger of the idea of substance as Leibniz understood it, namely as a monad. In order to carry out this task, the Marburg lecture of the summer semester in 19286 is taken as a basis. With the aim of identifying and evaluating the consequences of the Heideggerian interpretation, some explanations that complement the exposition and discussion are added. To this purpose, the lecture course given by Heidegger in the winter 1935/1936 at the University of Freiburg i. Br., is taken into account.