Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

Este artículo describe la regulación del derecho a la educación en la legislación peruana. En primer lugar, analiza la relación entre educación y derecho. La educación es un término metalegal; la ley solo garantiza formalidades en torno a la educación, excepcionalmente, algún principio metajurídico sobre la educación. Luego, el autor describe la educación como una relación. Finalmente, determina las relaciones educativas protegidas en el Perú: padres-hijos, educación pública y educación religiosa.

El 22 de julio del 2020 falleció Alfredo Aguilar Medina, un educador a carta cabal que mantuvo durante toda su vida un rol muy activo por el desarrollo de la educación arequipeña. Fue fundador de la ONG Corpa&dos y un académico con una visión integral de la educación, que acompañó su multifacética labor con diversas actividades formativas, administrativas y culturales.

The recognition of rights of nature is one of the most innovative aspects of the current Constitution of Ecuador and has attracted the attention of lawyers all over the world. This especially since 2019, when the Constitutional Court of Ecuador began to systematicallyconcretize the abstract constitutional terms and examine the relation between rights of nature and other constitutional rights and guarantees. This paper aims to contribute to the latter by analyzing the constitutional guarantee of compulsory legislative (instead of e.g. administrative) regulation (reserva de ley) and the right to legal certainty and its role in defending rights of nature. After having introduced both constitutional concepts, the article proceeds to examine the Constitutional Court judgements n.° 32-17-IN/21 y n.° 22-18-IN/21 (Mangrove Case) focusing on the guarantee of compulsory legislative regulation (reserva de ley) and legal certainty as means to protect rights of nature. It is shown, that through the discussed constitutional concepts the Constitutional Court of Ecuador has limited the administrative regulation of rights of nature appealing to the responsibility of the legislator in matters of fundamental constitutional relevance, among them, rights of nature. The paper concludes that Constitutional Court of Ecuador thereby not only defends rights of nature but also strengthens participative democracy.

Within many Indigenous cultures, traditional and spiritual knowledge is considered secret. It requires initiation and is safeguarded by different groups or levels of religious authority within a community. Transmission of such knowledge is usually performed at specific times, places and to selected peoples only. When Indigenous communities are claiming their rights to traditional land in western-oriented legal forums, they are required to provide proof of their connection to the lands and speak about the importance the sacred grounds hold in their tradition–and are required to do so according to Western legal discourse and protocol. When requirements for evidence neither represent nor respect Native culture, Indigenous parties to the claim often go silent, or else risk silencing the practices they originally aimed to protect. This article discusses the dilemma Indigenous communities face when asked to provide evidence despite cultural restrictions on traditional knowledge transfer. It first looks at evidence and secret knowledge in the case Pueblo of Jemez vs. United States of America (2019) adjudicated in federal US courts, and suggests a set of alternative evidentiary mappings that respect Jemez Pueblo rules of traditional knowledge sharing, produced by the author and Jemez tribal members. It then turns to acts of refusal to share detailed information on sacred sites and its consequences, litigated over in the US federal court cases Havasupai Tribe v. United States of America (1990) and Pueblo of Sandia vs. United States of America (1995). Finally, it discusses questions of evidence production in the case Pueblos Indígenas Tagaeri y Taromenane vs Ecuador, the first case on peoples in voluntary isolation to be adjudicated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

Nature, the generator of the essential elements to sustain life on the planet, seems limited in terms of conceptualization within formal regulations. Through constitutional recognition of the rights of nature, Ecuador develops constitutional precepts that are notcomplemented by hierarchically inferior laws. The Ecuadorian Amazon, being part of the most important ecosystem on the planet, becomes a vital territory for the application of human rights, which has a fundamental importance in the essential elements to sustain life at a global level, such as water. This situation becomes more relevant because the constitution recognizes water as a human right. In the territories, that form part of the Andes mountain range and the Amazon basin within the Ecuadorian jurisdiction live native peoples and nationalities whose ways of life linked to different ecosystems have allowed them to develop their legal systems. These have been violated by extractive activities permitted by secondary regulations hierarchically inferior to the constitution and international treaties and conventions. In this context, this work contributes, based on the conceptualization analysis, to identify the need to build a path to face the vulnerability of the human being as part of a world in danger of extinction.

The Constitution of Ecuador opted for an inclusive and integrating vision that brought together the European idea and the Amerindian notion of Nature and the Environment. From there, various contradictions are reproduced in the constitutional text in developing principles, rights, and precepts. This article analyzes the interpretation of the term biodiversity in the current Constitution of Ecuador, the existing contradictions between the definitions and terms included in the constitutional text, and the significance of biodiversity in an intercultural country where nature is recognized as a subject of rights. Likewise, this article studies how Ecuador has transited between two different perspectives of perceiving the Environment and Nature in less than three decades. Also, it examines if the intercultural interpretation of biodiversity is correctly positioned in the constitutional text. In addition, the article analyzes the Ecuadorian environmental regulations, focusing on the development of the constitutional precepts related to biodiversity, and highlights the need for the inclusion of concepts such as Pacha Mama and Interculturality. Finally, when analyzing the development of biodiversity valuation, the article concludes that environmental regulations are regressive and reaffirm a utilitarian vision about the resources, even in the context of traditional knowledge guaranteed in the Constitution of Ecuador.

Human rights defenders are usually perceived in their individuality, but not in the organizational and community context to which they belong and in which they wage their collective struggles. This contributes to the fact that the risk of human rights violations in the communities is not sufficiently addressed. To influence the analysis of the risk context and the reaction capacity for the transformation of vulnerabilities in communities and civil society organizations, a risk assessment model was designed, with elements for mapping based on International Human Rights Law, as the axis of dialogue between communities and States. This document describes the elaboration of this model and its components. It makes explicit the objective of advancing and qualifying the duty to control conventionality in the acts of the public function.

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La noción del interés superior del niño o del menor sintetiza, en la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño de 1989, la adecuada satisfacción de los derechos fundamentales de las personas menores de edad, no emancipadas, en su debida conjunción con los derechos de todos, que es el objetivo específico de este acuerdo internacional que forma parte del Derecho internacional universal en el que ha de integrarse hermenéuticamente. Es de destacar el papel preeminente que se reconoce al respecto a la familia y, en particular, a los padres. El derecho a la educación en libertad es uno de los derechos fundamentales a que se vincula el interés superior del menor. La Convención le dedica específicamente dos de sus artículos, y contiene otros de los que se desprenden consecuencias para él, pero no introduce exigencias que no estén ya establecidas expresa o implícitamente en el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de 1966, con cuyo significativo art. 13.3 debe complementarse, además, especialmente, lo dispuesto en la Convención. Esta no permite reducir indebidamente los derechos prioritarios de los padres en la educación de sus hijos, cuya efectividad es además garantía sustancial de una sociedad libre.