Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

What kind of agency is required for legal standing? What are the cognitive and rational requirements assumed by legal systems about the subjects of the law? How is it that humans comply with these requirements? In previous work,1 we argued that these questions require a new approach to legal theory, based on recent findings in cognitive science, and which goes beyond extant neuro-legal approaches. We now elaborate on this proposal, now focusing on issues regarding agency and normativity, including types of agency that are relevant for social epistemology. The main conclusion of the paper is that the high cognitive demands on the explicit rational capacities of agents assumed by legal philosophy are not only incompatible with findings in psychology, but also that a careful and systematic analysis of moral and epistemic agency is required to fully comprehend legal normativity. Our main argument is that forms of collective agency, moral and epistemic, differ from individual agency, which must also be distinguished as moral and epistemic. Crucially, collective agency differs from individual agency not merely because of differences in rational standards, but fundamentally because of constraints on the cognitive integration of information. Several consequences of this approach are assessed, including aspects of information integration for judgment and decision-making, reliable communication in epistemic agency, and the integration of moral considerations in legal reasoning. A thorough revision of the notion of “autonomy” is justified under the present proposal, partly because the standard requirements for legal standing and autonomy are too demanding and unrealistic in many cases, and partly because collective agency needs to be taken into consideration as a fundamental kind of legally responsible agency for processes of information integration. By relying on the distinction between epistemic and moral forms of reasoning, we explain how legal systems demand high levels of cognitive integration for legal responsibility at the collective level.

This article begins with the common assumption that modern legal systems require that judicial decisions must be substantiated. Some legal philosophers, starting from this practical requirement, have developed different theoretical proposals to explain the structure and functioning of judicial decisions, but also offer evaluation criteria that enables us to determine if a certain judicial decision is properly justified. In this article, some of these proposals are reconstructed and classified into two different models: the narrow theory of judicial syllogism and the broad theory of judicial syllogism. Secondly, a complicated problem that afflict these models, “the rule following paradox”, is made explicit. I then explore a step forward to overcome this problem and I call it the “Pragmatist Theory of Judicial Decision”. Finally, a plausible way to conceptually accommodate the most relevant theoretical contributions of each of these three models is offered.

Fundamental principles of criminal law theory lack a normative-structural analysis. Atienza´s and Ruiz Manero´s proposal in regards to legal decisions contain a typology of mandatory norms (rules, principles in a broad sense and directives) that is especially suitable for an analytical reconstruction of principles of criminal law. This proposal is also relevant and useful in the field of constitutional courts’ decisions related to Criminal law, because the principle or test of proportionality in its strict sense classifies fundamental rights into rules and principles. My aim in this paper is to discuss and propose a groundwork for normative reconstruction of the principles of criminal law using Atienza’s and Ruiz Manero’s framework.

To understand why the interactions of science with the legal system can be so problematic, it’s not enough to gesture vaguely towards a supposed contrast between scientific and legal “modes of thinking”; we need to look, instead, to the consequences of the different purposes of science and the law, the different constraints under which they pursue those purposes, and the different cultures of the two enterprises. From this perspective we can see why the law sometimes asks more of science than science can give, and sometimes gets less from science than science could give; and also why a simple dichotomy of “scientific inference” vs. “legal reasoning” is more misleading than helpful.

Español¿Es la abstracción de la ley, del contexto, de las necesidades, las capacidades, las virtudes o los vicios de personas concretas, algo de valor moral? Lucy responde en sentido positivo y muestra cómo el juicio abstracto de la ley (LAJ) está conectado con tres concepciones particulares de dignidad, igualdad y comunidad. En esta pieza, me enfoco en la igualdad por encima de los otros valores. Primero voy a dar una breve visión general del libro. Luego, señalaré lo que considero las contribuciones más significativas. Más tarde, haré tres preguntas para que podamos ilustrar más puntos del libro y entablar una discusión crítica.InglésIs the law’s abstraction from context, needs, abilities, virtues or vices of particular persons something morally valuable? Lucy answers in the positive and shows how Law’s abstract judgement (LAJ) is connected with three particular conceptions of dignity, equality, and community. In this piece, I focus on equality over the other values. In the rest of this paper, first I am going to provide a brief overview of the book. Then, I will point out what I consider to be the most significant contributions of the book regarding the connection between Law’s abstract judgment and equality. Later, I will ask three questions so we can illustrate further points of the book and engage in a critical discussion of LJ.FrancésL'abstraction de la loi, du contexte, des besoins, des capacités, des vertus ou des vices de personnes spécifiques est-elle quelque chose de valeur morale ? Lucy répond dans le sens positif et montre comment le jugement abstrait de la loi (LAJ, par son acronyme en anglais) est lié à trois conceptions particulières de la dignité, de l'égalité et de la communauté. Dans cet article, je me concentre sur l'égalité au-dessus de toutes les autres valeurs. D'abord, je vais donner un bref aperçu du livre. Ensuite, je soulignerai ce que je considère comme les contributions les plus importantes. Plus tard, je poserai trois questions afin que nous puissions illustrer plus de points du livre et engager une discussion critique.PortuguésA abstração da lei, do contexto, das necessidades, capacidades, virtudes ou vícios de pessoas específicas, é uma questão de valor moral? O Lucy responde no sentido positivo e mostra como o processo abstrato da lei (LAJ, pelo acrônimo em inglês) está conectado com três concepções particulares de dignidade, igualdade e comunidade. Nesta peça, meu foco está na igualdade acima de todos os outros valores. Primeiramente, vou dar uma breve visão geral do livro. Em seguida, destacarei as que considero as contribuições mais significativas. Posteriormente, farei três perguntas para que possamos ilustrar mais pontos do livro e iniciar uma discussão crítica.Chino将特定人群的法律，背景，需求，能力，美德或弊端进行抽象化是否具有道德价值？露西以积极的态度回应，并展示了法律的抽象判断（LAJ）如何与尊严，平等和社交这三个特定概念联系在一起。在本文中，我将重点放在平等上。首先，我将简要介绍这本书。然后，我将指出我认为本书最重要的贡献。稍后，我会问三个问题以便我们了解书中的更多要点并进行重要讨论。

EspañolLa iconografía de los tribunales de todo el mundo está dominada por la imagen de la Justicia. Casi invariablemente sostiene balanzas y una espada y a menudo tiene los ojos vendados porque, por supuesto, la justicia es ciega. Pero no del todo. Cuando nosotros, los destinatarios de la ley, nos encontramos en la sala del tribunal frente a la sentencia, o leemos el copioso y complejo cuerpo de "lo que se debe y lo que no se debe hacer" en materia jurídica según la legislación, en las sentencias judiciales y en nuestros libros de texto jurídicos, una cosa se hace evidente: la ley no está interesada en todos los aspectos de nuestro carácter, nuestra conducta y nuestro contexto.InglésCourthouse iconography around the world is dominated by the image of Justitia. She almost invariably holds scales and a sword and she is often blindfolded because, of course, justice is blind. But not quite. Or so I argue in Law’s Judgement. For when we —the addressees of the law— stand in the court room facing judgement, or read the copious and complex body of juristic ‘do’s and don’ts’ we find in statutes, court judgements and in our legal textbooks, one thing becomes obvious: the law is certainly not interested in every aspect of our character, conduct and context.FrancésL'iconographie des tribunaux du monde entier est dominée par l'image de la justice. Presque invariablement, elle tient une balance et une épée et a souvent les yeux bandés parce que, bien sûr, on sait que la justice est aveugle, mais pas tout à fait. Lorsque nous, les destinataires de la loi, nous trouvons dans la salle d'audience face à la sentence, ou lisons le corpus copieux et complexe de "ce qui devrait être fait et ce qui ne devrait pas être fait" en matière juridique selon la législation, chez les décisions de justice et de nos manuels juridiques, une chose devient claire : la loi ne concerne pas tous les aspects de notre caractère, de notre conduite ni de notre contexte.PortuguésA iconografia dos tribunais do mundo todo é dominada pela imagem da Justiça. Quase invariavelmente, ele segura uma balança e uma espada e, muitas vezes, está com os olhos vendados porque, é claro que a justiça é cega, mas não exatamente. Quando nós, destinatários da lei, nos encontramos na sala do tribunal face à sentença, ou lemos o copioso e complexo corpo do "que deve e o que não deve ser feito" em matéria jurídica de acordo com a legislação, nas decisões judiciais e de nossos livros jurídicos, uma coisa fica clara: a lei não se preocupa com todos os aspectos de nosso caráter, nossa conduta nem nosso contexto.Chino全世界法官的肖像画以正义形象为主导。他几乎总是拿着天平和利剑，而且常常蒙着眼睛，当然因为正义是盲目的，但并不总是如此。当我们（法律的接受者）发现自己面对法庭的判决，或者阅读法律中有关法律事项如“应该做什么和不应该做什么”的充实而复杂的内容时，从法院的裁决和我们的法律教科书中，有一件事情日趋清楚：法律对我们品格，行为和背景的所有方面都并不感兴趣。