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La partida de amigos queridos y admirados, como José R. Silva de Choudens en noviembre de 2019, se convirtió en una ocasión, no exenta de dolor, para hacerme recordar que debemos esforzarnos por liberarnos de la ilusión natural y casi inevitable en nosotros de creernos y actuar como si fuéramos los protagonistas alrededor de quienes giran los acontecimientos que se suceden en la vida de la que tenemos consciencia inmediata. En esos momentos de gran tristeza, por contraste con las excelencias diáfanas que exhibe esa misma humanidad en seres como José, se nos hacen patentemente claros los contornos sombríos de nuestra propia humanidad, no sólo de su finitud y falibilidad, sino de su egocentrismo habitual.

In this article José R. Silva de Choudens examines the interpretation given by José Ortega y Gasset in Del Optimismo en Leibniz to a key topic in Leibniz’s metaphysics: his peculiar way of understanding God’s creative act in virtue of which he claims that human freedom is compatible with the determinism that prevails in the phenomenal world. According to Ortega, Leibniz fails in this effort because his absolute logicism inevitably leads to a necessitarianism similar to that of Spinoza. This view is analyzed in light of Leibniz’s ontological and epistemological principles that Ortega either ignores, or misunderstands their meaning and implications in order to show that the inconsistency does not lie in the manner in which Leibniz thinks of God, but in Ortega’s interpretation of this crucial aspect of Leibniz’s metaphysics

The focus of this article is Leibniz’s aperture towards a dynamic ontology beginning with the idea of corporeal substance as live force and the monad as activity, and proceeding with other ideas such as event and virtuality, both of which are implied in the concept in so far as it brings together universality and singularity.

My starting point in this article is the transcendental character of Husserlian phenomenology. This character receives a precise definition and actualization in Husserl’s concrete intentional analyses. It is my aim to expound and discuss several of these transcendental structures, taking into account mainly the research manuscripts published under the title Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934), Die C-Manuskripte, which gathers the results of Husserl’s final research on time. They deal with the transcendental structures operating in the most originary level presupposed by all constitution of the temporality of the ontic since they thematize the temporalization of immanent objects and the self-temporalization of the transcendental ego (in particular the former), that is, structures such as those which make possible the temporalization of the so called “hyletic data”, namely, those responsible for bringing such data into the present, including their immediate past and future (perceptual, retentional and protentional lived experiences). Those lived experiences which wake up objects from their state of latency in oblivion, such as “re-presentations”, re-memories in particular, are considered too. The problem of the possibility of having the object’s past is discussed with some amplitude. The treatment of this topic takes places within the framework of a general consideration of temporalizing lived experiences, from perceptual to re-memorative lived experiences. 

Since both analytical and dialectical knowledge are components of that Westernrationality which aspires to reclaim true knowledge of reality, it is necessary to identify the argument that may lead us to clarify the minimal distinction between both of them. In order to reach such a distinction, we base on Hegeland focus not on the ideological, but on the logical and phenomenological dimension. Even though Hegel culminates dialectical knowledge and employs it to pass judgment on the of insufficiency of analytical knowledge, his argument—although profound and convincing—might appear not compelling since it does not recognize that both types of knowledge aspire to comprehend the whole of reality. So, a closer and more complete argument to distinguish between both sorts of knowledge and their distinct modalities may be better grounded on the premises that take into account the relationship between contraries, the modality of totality, the concept of substance, and the import of the particular. We will also defend the necessity of viewing analytical and dialectical knowledge as two constants throughout the history of Western philosophy. Much is lost when rationality is reduced to the analytical mode (Positivism), and also when their difference is obliterated by a subjectivist metaphysical stance that admits of only one kind of rationality (Heidegger). Both these attitudes toward rationality do not pay heed to something fundamental in the history of modern thought: Hegel’s contribution by transforming his dialectics into a mode of rationality suitable to knowthe reality of the spiritual.

In this article, I give an overview over the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. This school is comprised, in the main, of the thinkers Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer. I will present their philosophy as a transcendental philosophy of culture, following Kant’s main philosophical tenets. My interpretation of this school differs, however, from most presentations which focus on the factum of the modern natural sciences as the main paradigm of this school. Instead, I argue that what makes this philosophy a timely and interesting philosophical position is the starting point from the factum in each cultural region, to expose the constitutive principles of each cultural region. I then show how this approach has come to full fruition in Cassirer’s philosophy of the symbolic, which I interpret as a “symbolic idealism” to account philosophically for all forms of culture. I conclude by drawing out some implications of this philosophy: cultural pluralism and methodological compatibilism, leading, in a Kantian sense of a regulative ideal, to the self-liberation of humanity in and through culture.

Hume’s theory of justice has been criticized for its narrow focus on the stability of external goods, securing private property. In Hume’s defense two strategies has been typically adopted: the first one, aims to show how his understanding of justice in the Treatise improved in later works, where justice includes references to fairness and rights. The second, seeks to explain the thin role of justice within Hume’s robust and pluralistic catalogue of virtues, as stemming from his belief about the importance of a proper balance and mixture of virtues in a perfect character as well as in a flourishing society. My purpose is to explore a third path, the artifice or politeness, designed as complementary to the rules of justice. Its effects are related with the moral demand of mutual recognition.

While Descartes defends the real distinction between soul and body, he characterizes human beings as the union of both. The so-called Cartesian dualism neglects the relationship between the soul and the body in human beings and overlooks that the term substance in Descartes is not used univocally. In dialogue with É. Balibar and J. Cottingham, the complexity of this notion and its relationship to that of attribute will be highlighted. Following the common thread of this problem, this article highlights thatin Descartes, human beings as such are not considered as substances. What is described is the union as substantial, a union that depends on other substances without itself being one. To conclude that human life is not a substance-thing paves the way to considerations about human beings that cannot be reduced to a self-grounded subjectivity

Heidegger constantly claimed that ordinary grammar is inadequate for one reason or another. In this article, I analyze his different views of grammar across three stages of his philosophy—from his early ventures in pure logic, through his project of fundamental ontology and existential phenomenology, to his later reflections in terms of beyng-historical thinking (seynsgeschichtliches Denken). I claim that his appropriations of the Aristotelian logos, particularly in terms of its supposedly original functions, is a constant in his concept of language. The key to his concepts of grammar lies in the synthesis of logos, which basically involves assembling something as something. My analysis shows how Heidegger’s distinctions between a primordial synthesis and its allegedly derivative and defective forms are applied in his critiques of ordinary grammar throughout the development of his thought. I also discuss the problematic nature of Heidegger’s own critiques and prescriptions regarding grammar, which I argue is exacerbated in his later philosophy.

In the fourth paragraph of the third meditation, Descartes insists that he must know that God is his creator and that God is not a deceiver, “for without a knowledge of these two truths, I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything”. On the other hand, in the Replies to Objections II (paragraphs 38 –40), he urges that there are some claims, for example, that I, while I think exist; that what is once done cannot be undone, which do not require the divine guarantee: “What is it to us, though perchance someone feigns that that, of the truth we are so firmly persuaded, appears false to God or to an angel, and hence is, absolutely speaking, false...We have assumed a conviction so strong that nothing can remove it, and this persuasion is clearly the same as perfect certitude.” In my article I examine these two different views in Descartes’ writings, in order to determine which view is Descartes’ official view regarding the need for the divine guarantee. I conclude my discussion with an explanation as to why Descartes holds that certain propositions do not require the divine guarantee in order for us to be confident that they are certain, and other propositions do require the divine guarantee.