Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

Arturo Pérez-Reverte has always shown a preference for classic writers to tell stories with a fast pace, precise details and a diversity of intertextual references. For decades, he explored the historical narrative, the adventure novels with a hint of mystery and the war genre. Detached from any hint of idealism or heroic ideals. Even though much has been said about the military and existentialist character of his tired heroes, not much has been explored about his spies, who following the steps of the main authors in the international scenario, went from being amateur detectives to turn into professional agents. The purpose of this essay is to show how Pérez-Reverte follows the legacy of writers such as Robert Ludlum, Len Deighton, Somerset Maugham, Eric Ambler and John Le Carré in order to recover the historical past from a sceptic perspective. In doing so, Pérez-Reverte presents the reader with a skeptical portrait of a recognizable the past which falls into the parameters of the spy novel according to Boltanski, Corcuff, Mandel, Tadié, Magris and Wolfe.

Ovid and Lorenzo Valla, two authors separated by fourteen centuries, write about tragic love. Their narrations share plot and protagonists: two young teenagers who decide to live their love in freedom, far from impositions, and end fatally. Ovid in his Metamorphosis includes the legend of Pyramus and Thisbe; in turn, Lorenzo Valla in Historiarum Ferdinandi regis Aragoniae Libri tres introduces the story that gives its name to the Peña de los Enamorados in Antequera. We will treat a comparison between common and different elements and how this forms of a canon of Historical Poetics.

In this article, I review the studies on the count of the original text, which have been carried out by comparing the printer’s original and the print of the Vida política de todos los estados de mujeres by Juan de la Cerda (1599). I take as a basis the previous works of Garza Merino and Rodríguez Rodríguez, I review their contributions, I carry out my own analysis of sheets H and I and, finally, I show the conclusions obtained regarding the incidence of typesetter on the text in the passage from the printer’s original to the print.

Countless pages have been written about love, as well as about other issues that have worried mankind throughout all time, such as God, death, time, etc. However, there are not many reflections in the West about the history of love and the current state of the affair, although there are about eroticism and sex. For this reason, given the preeminent place that this feeling occupies in our lives, some reflections in light of the findings of the anthropologist Helen Fisher are presented in this contribution. Her studies and her thought, imbued with deep humanism, are essential to know and progress in everything related to love. If this is a basic drive, a survival mechanism, as she scientifically demonstrates, should we pay more attention to its benefits and the damaging and uncontrolled effects it sometimes causes? It would be desirable for Fisher’s work to be disseminated through informative texts and her contributions to enrich the curriculum of the educational system so that our young people, and not so young, knew more about an issue that worries them so much and raises so many questions. Thus, with greater knowledge and awareness, behaviors that are very harmful, such as gender violence and male chauvinism, could be amended. An authentic emotional education is urgent; our society must care more about the person and must be more attentive to this vital need of the individual in order to correct possible deviations due to instinctive behaviors, through education and reflection on freedom.

The «first» novel by Antonio Prieto, Tres Pisadas de hombre, was awarded the Premio Planeta in 1955. In the wake of its launch into one of the most considered places in the literary world, there were many criticisms raised by the work, recreating the emergence of a multiplicity of opinions that led it to be considered as the «young promise» of the Spanish novel.

Both the Arabic and Spanish languages have several synonyms that are considered one of the resources of their richness. In the Holy Quran it is noted that all the words used in the different situations are not interchangeable with their partial synonyms. In this article, we are going to study three types of partial synonymy in the Quran and how they are transmitted to Spanish in the translation of Cortés, as a model. We follow the descriptive-analytical method. We aim to discuss whether there is synonymy in the two studied languages, in general, and in the Quran, in particular. In addition, we study how synonyms or pseudo-synonyms in the Quran are translated into Spanish. We conclude that the addition of adjectives, the ellipsis or the repetition of one of the synonyms is used to translate the partial synonyms in the Quran.

The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical interpretation of bilateralism in terms of probabilism. In particular, to interpret the main concepts of bilateralism –acceptance, rejection and incoherence– in terms of the probabilistic notions of degree of belief and coherence. According to bilateralism, the meaning of logical connectives is determined by the acceptance and rejection conditions of the sentences in which they are involved, where acceptance and rejection cannot be reduced to one another. I will focus on a variant of bilateralism that understands logical consequence as the statement that it is incoherent to accept all the premises of a valid argument while rejecting all its conclusions. On the other hand, probabilism states that it is possible to interpret our degrees of belief in terms of probabilities. The aim of this work is then to interpret the concept of incoherence in terms of probability functions and determine when it is coherent to accept or to reject a proposition according to some threshold defined in terms of degrees of belief. To achieve this goal, we need both an interpretation of the concept of incoherence coined by the bilateralists as well as an interpretation of acceptance and rejection. I will show that a good interpretation of coherence in probabilistic terms can already be found in the literature. Then, I will give an interpretation of acceptance and rejection in terms of degrees of belief. In particular, I will show that it is possible to interpret these concepts in accordance with Locke’s thesis, the thesis that states that there is some threshold r such that if you believe some sentence in degree equal or higher than r you should accept it, without falling into epistemic paradoxes.

Logic, as some authors hold, is a normative discipline. It helps us tell right from wrong in the context of inferences, and it influences our inferential practices. On the other hand, Kripke and Padró’s Adoption Problem shows us that there is no  sense in the idea of adopting logical principles. Through a comparison with different interpretations of the idea of normativity in logic, I will analyze the compatibility between both positions. The apparent disconnection between what is right and the practices of the agents, added to the norm’s impotence to influence inferential  practices, will lead to a not so encouraging conclusion for those who want to hold both positions: if we accept that the adoption problem is a real problem, then we have to erase every trace of normativity from our conception of logic.

The adoption problem presented by Kripke and Padró argues that is not possible adopt new logical principles because to do it is mandatory reason with certain basics rules of reasoning, and if these basic rules are already in the reasoning there is not  necessary to adopt others. Following this idea, for reasoning is required have the  capacity of make use of basic principles. Kripke and Padró are supposing a limited case of reasoning, and they marked it as primitive. In opposition to this idea, I argue that there is no certainty that the reasoning has a similar structure to the basic rules of logic, because there are many ways to arrive to the same conclusion and there is no way to know which has been used. I maintain that does not exist a justification of the path followed in reasoning; therefore, the reasoning is not the object of study of logic. Following this argue, I show that the adoption problem has a true side, there are no way to adopt a logical principle, since the reasoning has not a similar structure  to any logic. Besides, it is possible to use many logics as models, those who can guide  the exchange of arguments.

According to the Adoption Problem (AP) certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted. Drawing on the AP, Suki Finn presents an argument against logical pluralism: Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI) both govern a general structure shared by every logical rule. As such, analogues of these two rules must be present in every meta-logic for any logical system L, effectively imposing a restriction to logical pluralism at the meta-level through their presence constituting a “meta-logical monism”. We find a tension in the dual role that the “unadoptable rules” must play in Finn’s “meta-logical monism” rendering it ineffective to restrict logical theories and systems. Consequently, we argue they cannot be both analogues of MP and UI and inferentially productive. We conclude with a series of suggestions regarding where a more satisfying and robust interpretation of the AP could lie.