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The aim of this article is to question if the adoption problem truly presents an obstacle for the revision of logic theories. Within this frame of reference, we argue in favor of an anti-exceptionalist point of view, and examine the kind of revision that follows from altering the inferential practices (logica utens) as a result of a change in the theoretical part of the system (logica docens). We also establish that even though the main consequence of the adoption problem can and should be conceded, that is to say, that there are certain logical principles that cannot be adopted, not only can we revise and alter our logic theory, but also reason in accordance with new inferential patterns. We conclude that the only direct consequence of the adoption problem is the rejection of the possibility to adopt certain logical principles, as well as the possibility to reason in accordance with them, but it does not imply the rejection of the possibility to incorporate or acquire them through other mechanisms. Particularly, it is still possible to do so in some cases through what we call “acquisition through immersion” and “acquisition through decoding”.          

The Adoption Problem claims that certain logical laws cannot be adopted. The argument is supposed to be a challenge to Logical anti-exceptionalism, insofar as the latter must justify the stance that logical theories can be revised. The purpose of this article is to answer this challenge, using as unit of analysis the concept of Lexical Taxonomies proposed by Kuhn. As we will show, a sociologically enriched vision of scientific theories and their changes permits to account for Logical anti-exceptionalism avoiding the Adoption Problem.

Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable.

Exceptionalism about logic assumes that logic has a privileged epistemological status, is normative, and cannot be revised. On the other hand, anti-exceptionalism rejects those particular traits. Recently, it has been suggested that the Adoption Problem of logical rules traverses the discussion between both positions. In this paper, I argue that that is not the case. In particular, I hold that if the Adoption Problem is a crucial threat to logic as a discipline, anti-exceptionalism about logic must be an incorrect position. Otherwise, exceptionalism about logic must be incorrect. In addition, I assess some consequences that follow from the previous analysis concerning the discussion on monism and pluralism about logic.

The adoption problem was originally raised by Saul Kripke. It is supposed to present a difficulty for Willard Van Orman Quine’s view that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. I want to argue for two things in relation to the adoption problem. The first is that the adoption problem does not really undermine the idea that statements of logical law are empirically confirmable. The second is that an analogue of the adoption problem can be developed in order to criticize a form of relativism about logic.

El problema de la adopción (Padró, 2015), según el cual es imposible adoptar una lógica, sugiere la idea de que la práctica de inferir es conceptualmente prioritaria a la lógica entendida como teoría. Este problema representa un desafío para la concepción antiexcepcionalista de la lógica, que entiende a los principios lógicos como meras hipótesis o como creencias sujetas a revisión. Desde nuestra perspectiva, el principal problema de esta concepción ha sido dejar abierta la pregunta sobre la naturaleza de la práctica de inferir. Sin embargo, nos parece completamente posible responder esta pregunta dentro del marco teórico antiexcepcionalista. En este trabajo desarrollamos una concepción naturalista de la práctica de inferir que viene a llenar el vacío dejado por el antiexcepcionalismo tradicional; y a su vez responde al desafío lanzado por el problema de la adopción.

Saul Kripke cuestionó el enfoque de la justificación de la lógica provisto por el modelo de Quine de la red de creencias sobre la base de un resultado que Romina Padró llamó “Problema de la adopción”. Sugiero una solución al problema de la adopción y una defensa de la estrategia quineana para la justificación de la lógica.

The present paper constitutes a critique of David Alm’s article “Punishment, Consent and Value”, in which it is argued that the consensual theory of punishment defended by C. S. Nino is false. Whilst Alm believes that this theory is grounded on an inadequate model of normative relations, here I will defend the hypothesis that such an assessment derives from an insufficient conception of human value and respect.

In the present work, I bring down a condition to adopt a logical principle. This condition is regard to the propositional knowledge and instead is propose the beneficial practical effective consequences given the logical principle. To achive this first an adoption problem reconstruction as a reductio is given. Second, the beneficial practical effective consequences are introduced and how an agent can use them to adopt a logical principle. Lastly, objections are considered and a conclusion close the work.

The sentence “all triangles are isosceles” is obviously false; however, a supposed “demonstration” of such an assertion has become very popular. Apparently, the authorship of this argument is due to Rouse Ball (Rouse Ball, 1905, pp. 38-39). Various authors have described it as a “fallacy” or “sophistry”. For example, Rouse Ball (1905, p. 38), E. A. Maxwell (1963, p. 13), Ya. S. Dubnov (2006, p. 2), Jesse Norman (2006, p. 2), Marvin J. Greenberg (2008, p. 25), K. Manders (2008, p. 94). Hamblin teaches that a fallacy, from the point of view of a long tradition dating back to Aristotle, is an argument that is not valid, but it seems so (Hamblin 1970, p. 12). So, if you want to claim that a given argument is a fallacy, two questions are essential: why is the argument wrong? Why does it look like it is correct? The objective is, answering both questions, to enrich the understanding of this case and, in general, some aspects of heterogeneous geometric proof.