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Human negativity is “dialectized” within the framework of the compensatory conceptions of Human Nature. After analysing this point, we will call attention to the difficulties it implies when approaching the contemporary questions around the Human Being. We will demonstrate the importance of renewing the notion of ‘absence of nature’ that circulates in a certain German line of research on the human, of which the notion of ‘poverty’ postulated by Heidegger will constitute the exemplum. Making use of the interpretation of “poverty” made by M. Blanchot, we will indicate the possibility of reading the absence of nature not as pure negativity but as nondialectizable passivity that affects Man.

This article analyzes the view of technology offered by two of the main critics of the contemporary culture: Spengler and Ortega. Their meditations on the meaning of technology are focused not only on its economic or social relevance, but also on its anthropological meaning. I expose their coincidences and their discrepancies when they see technology as a essential function of life. In contrast with Spengler’s disconsolate view, Ortega offers a more optimistic “sportive” conception of human being.

The logos could be regarded as a wound. The logos is the identity/difference between something and what this something is. The “between” itself. Such relation (identity/difference) separates to the same extent it unites, and it unites to the same extent it separates. For that reason Hegel writes: “Knowledge heals the wound that it itself is” (Erkennen heilt die Wunde, die es selber ist). The syllogism in Hegel is the attempt to stanch by means of the logos the wound that the logos itself is. This paper also shows how Hegel’s concept of syllogism was previously suggested by the “fairest of all bonds” (desmôn kállistos) in the platonic Timeo and by Kantian schematism.

ABSTRACT:The aim of the present text is to reflect on Kanawrow’s Tetralogy as an original approach to Kantian critcal metaphysics with a view to achieving the greatest clarity level of theoretical philosophising in formal and conceptual sense. Special light will be thrown here on some logical aspects of the transition from intentionality to intensionality. Transcendental synthesis is explicated toroughtly as a generative mechanism towards initially independent objectness: the virtual topos of thinking needs an emphasis on its metaphysically clarified purity. In accordance with my own approach the transition from a priori to a posteriori should be clearly explicated as a transition from intentionality to intensionality – to regional (actual) human experience which falls in the range of presumed open valences of thinking. The newly considered virtualistic phenomenon is in use in accordance with transcendentalising of actual experience. In addition, logical functionality of thinking receives a cognitive significance against our actual experience. That guarantees a variety of successful routes of transcendental schematism in its virtualistic version (transcendental phenomenology).KEYWORDSCRITICAL METAPHYSIC, VIRTUALISTIC METAPHYSICS, VIRTUAL TOPOS OF THINKING, UNLOCKING, DEVIRTUALISATION, TRANSCENDENTAL SYNTHESIS.RESUMENEl objetivo del presente texto es reflexionar sobre la tetralogía de Kanawrow como un enfoque original de la metafísica critica kantiana con el fin de alcanzar el mayor nivel de claridad de filosofar teórico en el sentido formal y conceptual. Se esclarecerán especialmente algunos aspectos lógicos de la transición de la intencionalidad hacia la intensionalidad. La síntesis trascendental se explica como un mecanismo generativo hacia la objetividad inicialmente independiente: el topos virtual de pensamiento necesita un énfasis en su pureza que es metafísicamente aclarada. De acuerdo con mi propio enfoque la transición de a priori a a posteriori debe estar claramente explicada como una transición de la intencionalidad a la intensionalidad - hacia la (real) experiencia regional humana que se encuentra en el rango de valencias abiertas presumidas del pensamiento. El considerado virtualistic phenomenon está en uso, de conformidad con transcendentalisacion de la experiencia actual. Además, la funcionalidad lógica del pensamiento recibe un significado cognitivo en contra de nuestra experiencia real. Estas consideraciones garantizan una variedad de rumbos exitosos del esquematismo trascendental en su versión virtualistica (fenomenología trascendental).PALABRAS CLAVESMETAFÍSICA CRÍTICA, METAFÍSICA VIRTUAL,TOPOS VIRTUAL DE PENSAMIENTO, DE VIRTUALIZACIÓN 

Contemporary thought on images focuses mostly on their massive presence and their endless reproduction. On the contrary, in this paper, I will focus on how images have been massively and systematically destroyed. If the interdisciplinary exam is a fundamental prerogative in visual studies, the volume Striking Images, Iconoclasms Past and Present (Ashgate 2013), compiled by excellent historians and archaeologists, could offer to philosophers an important frame of teamwork in thinking what the images are. The purpose of this paper is to present and discuss briefly some original aspects of these essays, by emphasizing the importance of means and reasons through which our ancestors have not only created, but also destroyed images. Once distinguished iconoclasm and mere vandalism, we could discover a fundamental ambiguity whereby any person who tries to preserve the images, finishes with wrecking them; while on the contrary somebody who appears as a destroyer, succeeds to fertilize new concepts and meanings for his/her own figurative tradition. Perhaps this ambiguity is not something that image suffers extrinsically, but something inherent to the image itself. And if it is so, he/she who wants to study the life of images, could perhaps find a privileged access to it, through a paradoxical logic that explains, instead, how images die.

In this study, we attempt to analyze the influence of the returning character of every form of understanding in the existential genesis of science in general. In a task that requires the articulation of subjects which appear in a disperse manner during the Marburg-period, we will attempt to manifest the triple structure of the pre understanding, and the way in which ontic sciences interpret the circular character of understanding, and struggle –in vain- to abandon it. Our research will reveal that the returning character of understanding defines not only the factic tasks of a science, but also its historical and traditional profile, its likelyhood for crisis and development, and its existential genesis in itself.

Genetic phenomenology aims to expose the conditions for the constitution of the sensible material in the inmanence of the consciousness. Thus, a field of the ego-life is determined as the «front room of the ego». From a genetic point of view, temporal synthesis is resignified as the first passive dimension of the consciousness. Our goal here is to establish how this synthesis is related to the passive association process.

This paper pursues to explain the origin and radical philosophical paradigm shift undergone by the philosopher from Navarre Juan David Garcia Bacca. Specifically, we will try to analyze how and why the Spanish philosopher moves from dismissing the possibility of a particular form of Spanish philosophizing from an ontological perspective, to treating poetry and literature as idiosyncratic ways of doing philosophy in Spanish. This typically Spanish way of doing philosophy in Spanish will be, therefore, crucial to understand the abandonment of the Garcibaccquian existentialist stage, and his renewed interest in the work of the poet Antonio Machado and his philosophizing by and for the people.

The current interpretation of the Cartesian science no longer sees it as a mere deduction from the metaphysical principles, but claims the role of experience in it. This paper will try to go one step further, arguing that there is an instrumental dimension in the Cartesian science. With this purpose in mind, we will analyze the modification performed by Descartes in the Dioptrics regarding the artifitial-natural relation, which enables this instrumentalist reading.

This paper aims to explain the Kantian background of Hugo Munsterberg’s philosophy of film. Our author, who was a renowned experimental psychologist and professor at Harvard, in 1916 produced a work that is considered the first systematic manifestation of film theory: The photoplay: a psychological study. We will focus on this book but also we’ll relate it to other Munsterberg’s texts in which his aesthetic theory appears. On the other hand, we will try to offer a theoretical and intellectual context in order to contextualize all his motivations and themes.