Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

I will relate some social and epistemic aspects involved in the conceptual development of the genetic model in the early Molecular Biology. I will use the link between Biology and Physics as a framework, which supports such assumptions, providing new methodologies, but mainly as a framework that provides a model of objectivity developed within Modern Tradition. Finally, I will interpret this relationship from the pragmatist perspective to embrace Rorty’s thesis on «the ontological priority of the social» which implies understanding biology as a part of a general cultural politics.

A desirable connection between nature, representation and rite is showed in our times in a really complicated way. This fact fi nds its cause in an eclipse of values and hierarchies and in the subsequent awakening of an apparent emptiness. It can be understood, nevertheless, as a one more step towards the renewal of the occidental values. All this renewal -whose sense remains unknown to us- began more than a century ago and continues along the current millennium.

We explain the meaning of a Sánchez Vázquez’s criticism about Nicol, namely, that the philosophy of the latter separates the being of man and his economic base. In accordance with our approach, this criticism expresses a difference of emphasis, not a fundamental disagreement, on  the grounds that both philosophers reject the strong economic determinism but instead accept that economy is a necessary condition for the other social structures, and because both Nicol and Sánchez Vázquez agree with the idea that man produces his own being through the creation of distinctive human needs.  

The thinking on Jean-Luc Nancy’s community notion presupposes an ontology of sense of Derrida’s heritage that explores the idea of differ and whose ultimate goal is to exceed from there to Heidegger and Bataille delving into the path opened for them. Having said that, basically is the line of thought of Carl Schmitt’s political theology the main rival of the French thinker theses. In short, what it is about is to oppose to all gated community, wrought, finished, an open community, inoperative and unfinished: a community of differ without concessions to the presence.

This article offers an analysis of Fichte’s interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy in his Grundlage des gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794) in order to determine why Spinoza is one of his privileged interlocutors in this work. My proposal is that Fichte considered this doctrine as the maximum representative of a position (dogmatism) that must be completed, not refuted. Fichte’s Doctrine of Science (practical idealism) is thus a way for the reconciliation of two apparently incompatible positions: determinism and freedom. Taking into account the broader problematic context in which this system emerges, I argue that Spinoza is not Fichte’s real enemy, but Jacobi.

The thesis that speakers of different languages show cognitive differences has been supported by linguistics, psychologist and philosophers. Many results suggest that there is a correlation between language and thought, but there is not a precise theoretical explanation of how language infl uences cognition. The aim of this paper is to analyze which explanatory mechanisms give an account of the results. First, I will analyze some empirical studies. Second, I will sketch five possible theoretical explanations. I argue for the theory of re-representation.

A recurring problem of the philosophy of Spinoza has been the question about the status of the attributes and its consideration in relation to the one Substance. Their equality is a necessary condition of the system and each attribute have to be representable only in terms of itself. From the attributes of Thought and Extension, in this paper I will focus on the rooted difficulties around the apparent greater extension of the attribute of Thought, sketching an interpretation that allows us to understand and express it in the terms that the spinozistic model demands.

In this paper I expose and analyze the berkeleian proposal of notional knowledge. Among other things, this proposal represents Berkeley´s attempt to know the mind or spirit, that is, the thinking and active thing that, by its own activity, results unrepresentable as idea. As such knowledge is already mentioned in the Philosophical Commentaries I will refer to them to know the origins of that proposal. However, as notional knowledge appears in more detail in later works I will make use especially the Treatise to tackle the complex notional doctrine.

The article aims to determine the role that has the concept of virtue in Husserl ́s ethics and how would its relationship with other dimensions of his ethics be. With this purpose, firstly, we sketch a presentation of the central aspects of classical virtue ethics and of the objections raised against it. Secondly, we deal with this topic in Husserl ́s philosophy through an analysis of texts from the 1920s, including texts published in the volumes XXXVII and XLII of the Husserliana series. Concluding, we reflect on the relationship virtue - self-determination and on the way Husserl ́s conception could solve some problems of the classical theory.

In this article we will attempt a critical reconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s argument against skeptical doubts about our perceptual experience, in a dialogue with previous approaches to the problem within the existing literature, and with the purpose of pointing out that the phenomenologist’s anti-skeptical argumental strategies do not need to be considered as presupposing a previous rejection of metaphysical realism and as, correlatively, based on an alternative ontology. To do this, we will appeal to an analogy with Merleau-Ponty’s critique of skeptical relativism concerning the «laws of thought»: if psychologistic doubts about our possible «confinement» in limited evidences, proper to our psychic constitution, are excluded, this is simply because, in order to articulate the skeptical tenet itself, we need to be considered capable of acknowledging as such those evidences which, however, cannot be evidences for us. The positive fact of the existence of a form of  experience such as ours, according to Merleau-Ponty, becomes in this way the insurmountable basis of any epistemological evaluation.