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The present text investigates the relationship between two contemporary authors, one French and the other German, about their approaches that unfold in the paths of the mechanistic materialism of the time, although Schopenhauer's is a special case. Both of their particular meditations will have implications in different disciplines developed by each one of the authors, such as physics, psychology, ethics, philosophy and morals. Taking the materialistic conceptions as their starting point, they mapped a universe which is drawn under a net that requires it to operate in terms of mechanical necessity. Therefore the agents are not completely free, this is because their deepest motivations and correlate –their actions– are anchored to an irrational Will of life in Schopenhauer’s case, whereas for Sade is about the sexual and dominium drives. With that said, phenomena such as love and freedom, in the roots of both authors' way of thinking result unfeasible or definitively implausible. Such a condition submerges the individuals in an out of proportion egoism which struggles for keeping their individual phenomenon while throwing them to a continuous fight, obnubilated by the representation principle. However there are two phenomena that manage to tear apart the appearances’ nature: for Schopenhauer is love, and for Sade it will be the perversion that hastens the dissolution of the individual phenomenon, either the own or the other’s. Within the works of Schopenhauer and Sade, love and perversion represent forms of access to freedom by either breaking through or denying the world’s structure, in its constant becoming under ordinary conditions. 

The paper approaches to the question of love in Hannah Arendt, in order to reconstruct the criticisms of traditional unworldly love with their anti-political impetus –romantic love, brotherhood, compassion–, and at the same time to delineate other worldly forms of love, that we found in the life and work of the German-Jewish thinker which are essential for political communities. In this context we concentrate into the criticism of romantic love present in her book on the life of Rahel Varnhagen, paying special attention to the condition as woman and its consequences in the love relationship. The dismantling of asymmetries between women and men, both in love relationships and in society, is fundamental to set up a common world and political communities that take in plurality and diversity. Arendt's reflections achieve a decentering of love with respect to the couple love, allowing its opening as a broader and worldliness phenomenon, expressed paradigmatically in amor mundi and in civic friendship. Thus, in dispute with the philosophical tradition, Arendt holds a conception of love, in which the love founded the common world and, at once, it becomes worldly.

Love, from the outset, seems to be a polysemous term that has been understood in multiple ways throughout the history of philosophy as a desire, a passion, or an affection. Hence, it includes such opposing approaches as those for whom it consists of a mere passionate inclination towards someone or something, to those who distinguish it as a disinterested tendency, generally supported by a value, such as love for truth or justice. In this article, however, we try to show that it is possible to trace some bipolarities based on the Greek and Latin roots of this term, in its nature and intensity, and in the object to which it is directed, which make it possible to better understand the wide philosophical cartography of love.

This text is an approximation to the relationships between suffering and knowing in Plato's philosophy. It considers the divine decree formulated in the Greek tragedy that human beings can only access knowledge through suffering: páthei máthos. The examples of Oedipus and the robbery of divine fire illustrate the force of this command. It is proposed that in Plato's thinking there is also a close relationship between suffering and knowing. The definition of the philosopher as a lover of wisdom expresses this idea, for he is seized by the passion of desire. He loves and longs for knowledge because he is aware of not possessing it. But to admit that one does not know is to recognize one's own limitations. The recognition of this insufficiency is a source of suffering. The philosopher suffers because he knows he is far from the full cultivation of his soul and intelligence. Thus, desire is the power that drives him to search for the full realization of his being. Plato characterizes this impulse as a theía manía (divine madness), in the sense that the philosopher's soul is possessed by the desire for the divine.

Love is a particularly relevant topic in Platonic philosophy, Christianity and psychoanalysis. In this text, I develop an argument that articulates some central motifs of these perspectives on love, in order to pose the question of its truth. The discussion begins with Augustine of Hippo's reflections on the death of his beloved friend, in Book IV of the Confessions, where he concludes that the love of God is superior to the love of the creature. This perspective will be contrasted with Slavoj Žižek's argument in which he establishes that the excessive fixation to a particular and mortal object is the inaugural act of the human condition, as well as its redemption. Finally, after delving through the Freudian analysis into the causes of the state of melancholy caused by the loss of the loved one, we will raise the question of true love from a platonic perspective, based on the argumentation that Alain Badiou elaborates on the matter, which will allow us conclude on the truth of the loving encounter, without resorting to a theology that imposes loving God above all.

This short text is an invitation to reflect on the idea of self-love, since as it has been constituted by current liberation movements (understand feminisms, enviromentalisms, union struggles, anti-racist struggles and labor movements), although they want to attribute a revolutionary and radical characteristic to it, it ends up adopting principles and behaviors of reactionary roots. To do this, the violent characteristic of self-love will first be reconstructed (in the young Hegel and in the capital work of Stirner) to later identify texts by some contemporary authors –such as Ricoeur, Lévinas or Dussel– other theorizations of love that can guide towards an understanding of it as something that may or may not be revolutionary (insofar as it is capable of radically changing some domination system), but that must leave the sphere of the Self.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the concept of love in Spinoza's philosophy. Linking the concept of love, in general terms, with his ontological and epistemological conception, so that the specific analysis deals with love as an epistemic/affective process. In the same sense, the three genres of knowledge and their implication in the concept of love will be analyzed. Trying to demonstrate the importance and centrality of the concept of love in Spinoza's philosophy.

The article proposes a revision of philosophical knowledge from the experience of love. With Plato as a point of departure and inspiration, philosophical knowledge is questioned as strictly rational, methodical, and distant from one's own experiences. Passionate love -erotic mania-, with its profound alterations, is presented as a process favorable to philosophical knowledge, which is the same knowledge of oneself.

Teresa de Lauretis plantea que para construir un sujeto feminista histórico no homogéneo las mujeres deben encontrar el parámetro de su identidad fuera de las dicotomías del discurso dominante androcéntrico que, si las incluye, es sólo como objetos de sus representaciones. Sin embargo, puesto que el sujeto está constituido por representaciones lingüísticas y culturales, y sus prácticas se encuentran reguladas por varias tecnologías sociales que prescriben y controlan las significaciones sociales; es posible subvertir la lógica androcéntrica y eurocéntrica a través de una posición discursiva excéntrica. Un lugar privilegiado para promover esta posición subversiva es a través de la crítica a la tecnología del cine hegemónico, uno de los aparatos sociales a partir de los cuales se construye la subjetividad; en tanto soporte material y actividad significante. Siguiendo esta dirección, a través de una lectura crítica del cine, es posible desentrañar la ideología que subyace en la representación hegemónica sobre las mujeres, reducidas al papel de objeto y ausentes como sujetos históricos y políticos. Bajo esta hipótesis, este trabajo se propone examinar posiciones discursivas excéntricas que subvierten la lógica dicotómica binaria y jerárquica propia de la Modernidad occidental, que relega a las mujeres al lugar de alteridad en relación a lo masculino y que las pretende homologar bajo la representación de una arquetípica Mujer. Lo cual revela, subsidiariamente, la potencia material que los discursos críticos del cine –posicionados desde el margen- tienen para desestabilizar el poder hegemónico androcéntrico y euronorcéntrico; a favor de un sujeto múltiple, contradictorio, disidente y otro.