ISSN: 2310-2799
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546,196 artículos
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Alvarado Marambio, José Tomás
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
Kripke proposed that the origin of an entity should be deemed as part of the essence of it. Kripke’s argument required a crucial premise stating that certain hunk of matter and certain other non-trivial conditions are sufficient to deliver the entity in question. Further efforts by philosophers like Nathan Salmon and Graeme Forbes to make this requirement both precise and feasible have all nevertheless ended in failure. Here it is argued why this failure will always recur in these lines. The problem of the necessity of origin should be tackled in a different vein. It is argued that there seems to be no middle ground between necessity of all conditions of origin and contingency of all those conditions. Particularly, the idea that conditions of origin may be for the most part necessary, allowing the possibility of slight changes in them, is incoherent with a sensible conception of the ontological realm of the modal.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Stigol, Nora
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
The aim of this paper is to introduce the present debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists in today’s philosophy of mind, in relation to the content of mental states. The debate deals with the issue of the existence of non-conceptual modes of representing the world. The subject under discussion is the non-conceptual features of the contents of certain mental states. The polemic is carried on mainly in three different domains: the one of representative states in creatures lacking conceptual abilities; the one of subpersonal states in information processing, and the one of perceptual experiences. I introduce and discuss the non-conceptual content notion and its legitimacy in these three domains.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Montero, Julio
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
In this paper I will try to establish an accurate criterion of equality for a deliberative democracy. In order to achieve this, I will begin by analyzing Rawls’ proposal and Sen’s criticisms to it. I will then present Guariglia’s Principle of Autonomy and I will expound its problems. Finally, using Bohman’s idea of “deliberative capability”, I will present my own criterion of equality. According to this principle, the state has to guarantee every citizen the minimum threshold of material and intellectual abilities that will allow him or her to take part in public deliberation. However, once this threshold is achieved, citizens themselves are the ones to decide which conception of economic and social justice is the most appropriate for their political community.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Fernández Beites, Pilar
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
This article deals with the problem of individual essence by appealing to Zubiri’s ontology, in which individuation is not only understood as mere singularity, like in classical philosophy, but as “diversity”. Zubiri’s theory is completed by introducing a new sense of individuality proper to humankind: individuality as “unrepeatability”. In order to account for this strong individuality, I use Scheler’s theory, which insists on the unrepeatability of the human “spirit”, and holds that the individual essence of the person depends on a spiritual character (ethos), and on an ordo amoris. Finally, in controversy with Scheler, I suggest that what provides individuality as unrepeatability is liberty.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
de Haro, Vicente
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
Las reseñas no incluyen resumen.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Lara Zavala, Nydia
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
Las reseñas no incluyen resumen.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
McDermid, Douglas
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
In this essay I propose not only to analyze a poem by Jorge Luis Borges, but also to connect that poem with a metaphilosophical idea of Plato’s —namely, the view that philosophy begins in wonder. For I argue that some poetry —Borges’ brief poem being an admirable example— can serve as a prelude to philosophy by arousing Platonic wonder in readers capable of experiencing it.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Gómez-Torrente, Mario
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
I explore an argument for epistemic non-factualism, the thesis that epistemic attributions do not describe facts. The argument is analogous to but independent of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument for non-factualism about rule-following. Some objections to the two arguments are considered and rejected, in particular accusations of incoherence and “reductivism”. The epistemic argument and a “skeptical solution” to it are argued to be part of Wittgenstein’s conception in On Certainty.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Lazos, Efraín
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
This paper discusses two points concerning Sosa’s alternativemodel of dreaming. First, given the model of dreaming as imagining, it is not clear why dreaming skepticism still arises. If dreaming does not compete epistemically with waking, then it does not seem to threaten the ordinary credit we give to our waking experiences. Secondly, the paper suggests that, in contrast to the traditional model, the model of storytelling lacks an important feature for our concept of dreaming, namely, that we have experiences and, frequently, beliefs.
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Año:
2005
ISSN:
1870-4913, 0185-2450
Ortiz-Millán, Gustavo
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Resumen
Las reseñas no incluyen resumen.
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