Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

Participatory Public Procurement is a State’s regulatory strategy for public procurement, which seeks to promote inclusion, equity and social dialogue by bringing certain communities or low-income people who were historically excluded from this market. Its purposes are to generate spaces for social participation, democratize income, highlight the role of certain subjects of special constitutional protection, break down inequalities, generate responsibility in the execution of public resources and contribute to the construction of the country. The purpose of this article is to study the CPP as a regulatory strategy for public procurement, which emerges as one of the various scenarios of participatory democracy, so it is not a recent policy but one that is under constant construction. In this sense, an analysis will be made of the PPP mechanisms with which participatory democracy has been re?ected in Colombia in the state contracting scenario. It will also show the efforts of other countries in the region to promote inclusion in the public procurement market, to show that these are isolated and poorly systematized tools with tenuous effects. In any case, the recommendations of international organizations such as the OECD should be considered to achieve a better design and implementation of CPP instruments.

The main objective is to analyse public policies surrounding the Yasuní ITT project in Ecuador, evaluating whether they respond to economic desires or basic needs, especially of Amazonian indigenous communities. The methodology includes a critical review of literature, analysis of government decrees, and specific case studies, such as the impact on the Waorani indigenous community. The research distinguishes between desires and needs, using Wiggins’ approaches, which differentiate needs by their independence from the individual’s mental state and their grounding in reality and human wellbeing, and desires as intentional and arbitrary. Carlos S. Nino and Harry Frankfurt reinforce the primacy of basic needs such as food, shelter, and security over desires. Yasuní ITT is an example of how public policies in Ecuador have favored the economic interests of the oil industry, through decrees allowing exploitation in protected areas, leading to deforestation and impacts on biodiversity and the health of indigenous communities. The research concludes that these policies prioritize desires of elites and transnationals over the basic needs of local indigenous communities like the Waorani indigenous people, perpetuating unsustainable and unequal development.

Much has already been written about secondary policies, and then promoted to horizontal and now almost on a par with the primary objective of public procurement-competition. It should be noted that European jurisprudence, followed by the Public Procurement Directives, has always limited the use of public procurement as a vehicle for the promotion of environmental, social and sustainable development policies, which has recently become increasingly emphasised with the transition from linear to circular economy. For reasons linked to the cross-cutting nature of environmental policies and the national economic connection of social policies, the former are more suited for harmonising member states’ legal systems. As a result, the promotion of the social impact of public procurement is often limited to matters in which the European Union legislates —the labour feld— or to the more primary dimensions of constitutionality associated with the principle of equality and Human Rights. Our re?ection therefore aims to go beyond what European case law and directives enshrine and recognise, asking whether environmental policies might contribute to social sustainability as well. We will try to prove this by presenting practical examples. The cases presented, as a method, are meant to be a “proof of concept”.

This article analyzes the anti-corruption discourse of Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration (2018–2024), focusing on the notion of “political will” as its guiding principle. It examines how this concept, frequently used in the anti-corruption literature as a critical variable, lacks clear operationalization. In practice, its use tends to be generic and rhetorical, allowing for the justification of selective anti-corruption efforts. Through an analysis of the Segalmex case—an alleged corruption scandal—the study evaluates whether government initiatives employed the concept of political will in this way. The findings suggest that the anti-corruption policy prioritized rhetoric, and the symbolism associated with political will, fostering a selective approach. In particular, the study observes that a strongly moralistic discourse tended to downplay irregularities committed by government officials. The conclusion is that the rhetoric of political will, when lacking clear definitions and commitments, paradoxically facilitates the justification and concealment of systemic dynamics of illegality, fraud, and embezzlement.

This article provides a detailed account of Mexico’s foreign policy on human rights during the six-year term of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). It examines both continuity and change relative to previous administrations, with particular attention to tensions between the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the policy of openness to international scrutiny and monitoring. The analysis identifies continuity in key actions aimed at maintaining Mexico’s traditional openness, a defining feature of its human rights foreign policy since the beginning of the century. It also notes the persistence of “denial” behaviors—characteristic of a more “sovereigntist” foreign policy—that have been evident since the Peña Nieto administration. At the same time, the AMLO government introduced changes suggesting a growing preference for sovereignty and non-intervention as foundational principles of Mexico’s foreign policy on human rights. The article concludes that, in the overall balance between openness and sovereignty, the latter has continued to gain ground—though not to the point of entirely displacing the former.

This article examines the implementation of two central objectives of the social policy agenda proposed by the administration of President López Obrador: universalism and elimination of intermediaries in service provision. We argue that these two objectives may have different effects on reducing inequalities in social protection, depending on their specific characteristics. Our analysis focuses on three major interventions: non-contributory pensions (Pensión para el Bienestar), the health services reform, and the childcare services reform. The findings reveal mixed results. Regarding the first objective, universalism, there was a significant increase in the coverage of non-contributory pensions. However, effective access to public health care services and cash transfers for early childhood remains lacking. As for eliminating intermediaries, the program management centralization did not enhance government capacities to ensure adequate service provision. Re-centralization has increased reliance on market-based solutions in health services and reinforced the role of families as the main providers of care.

To what extent does ideology influence public tolerance of administrative burdens that hinder access to public services and programs? Drawing on original survey data from Mexico, this study shows that demand for lower administrative burdens is primarily associated with segments of the electorate that identify with the left. However, the effect of ideology weakens among individuals with a direct relationship to the state, whether as beneficiaries of public programs or as taxpayers. The increase or reduction of administrative burdens is, therefore, not merely a technical matter of service or benefit administration but a political issue with potentially significant electoral implications. This helps explain why a leftist government like that of López Obrador prioritized reducing intermediaries and conditionalities in the distribution of social benefits.