Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

This reflection aims to examine the question of philosophy from an approach that seeks to highlight the ways in whichartistic and philosophical experience configure two particular ways of relating sensorially and cognitively toreality. Taking in consideration the notion of wonder, we bet on an opening and a reconsideration of both experiences, inparticular of artistic experience. In this sense, art and aesthetic experience will be understood, from a hermeneuticapproach, as forms of sensitive thinking. In order to elaborate this approach, I turn to the thought of Hans-Georg Gadamer, for whom the experience of an artwork must be conceived as an understanding of what is experienced in them, paying attention to their mode of being , as forms of knowledge. From this perspective, it will be examined how cinematographic images, particularly inOusmane Sembène’s La noire de… and Ingmar Bergman’s Persona , constitute a mode of recognition that can be theoccasion to problematize and think not only from but also with images. The way in which both approach the representation of identity through celluloid are examples that allow us to think of images as generators of meaning.

Recognizing Hume racist expressions in his essay "Of National Characters", and without intending to absolve him of this accusation, the author will argue that there are various reasons to continue reading his work. Among them, his philosophy still sheds light on enormous problems that oppress large sectors of the population of Puerto Rico and the planet; and that through a public education permeated by Hume's "mitigated skepticism", philosophy can emancipate people from the servitude that superstition exerts over their minds, and thus contribute to the improvement of our society.

This article seeks to point out the importance of nurses in some of Plato's works, highlighting the parallel between them and philosophers. It is shown that both characters have a fundamental educational tool to carry outa satisfactory education: the power of persuasion of the former, the truth for the latter. The author explains in what sense Plato's references to nurses, particularly in the Laws, point to their decisive and problematic role in the education of the body and emotions of future citizens.

Introduction to this special issue.

This work consists of a meditation on the question of philosophy based on four main axes: the cosmopolitan mood of the philosophical experience, the artistic-poetic character of its writing, its theoretical vocation and its conceptual creation that distinguishes it from other disciplines and the historical and geopolitical idiosyncrasy that nuances its cosmopolitan mood. Finally, the challenge of reality is addressed, which leads to the ethical and ontological commitment of every philosophical proposal.

Review about the book Dialogue and the New Cosmopolitanism: Conversatios with Edward Demonchonok.

The present article provides an analysis of the foundations of Epicurean thanatology, that is, the philosophical resources of Epicureanism directed at overcoming the fear of death. I offer an interpretation of Epicurus' argument on the value of death —i. e . «death is nothing to us»— from a correlative perspective, which considers that the understanding of the argument by itself is not an efficient cause, but rather a philosophical principle which, in correlation with other constituents, contributes indirectly to the liberation from the fear of death. Following this premise, I begin with a discussion of two causative approaches to Epicurus' thanatological argument (M. Nussbaum & D. Suits); then I offer a correlative approach that integrates the Epicurean analysis and understanding of death into the scope of two philosophical practices: 1) the study of nature and 2) the examination of beliefs, inscribed in the dynamics of progress and spiritual direction in the Epicurean communities.

Epistemic modesty is a hermeneutic category that has sometimes been used with reference to certain authors or intellectual trends in ancient thought. In this article, I present my doubts about the concept, especially when applied to ancient theories of knowledge. I begin by highlighting two plausible determinations of epistemic modesty, the first related to diatribes among philosophical schools, the second to ethics and character formation. Next, I discuss the interpretive problems that arise from attributing modesty, a psychological trait rather than a virtue, to literary and philosophical texts usually characterized by conflicting or ambiguous epistemic attitudes. I argue that an objective determination of modesty seems improbable, unless we understand modesty, as I propose somewhat paradoxically, as a way of affirming something by means of negation and dissimulation (this is my third determination of the concept). I conclude by briefly presenting some remarkable recent perspectives on epistemic modesty, mostly centered on Platonic-Socratic dialogues. This paves the way for three further determinations of the concept. They stem, however, from a modern epistemological background, whose features may turn out to be partly at odds with ancient epistemological conceptions.

Chrysippus’ ‘Nobody’ argument is reported by Simplicius (SVF 2.278) as his main argument for nominalism: universals are pseudo-entities, objects that may seem like something but are actually nothing. In this paper, I explore this report and try to reach the following conclusions. The primary reason given by Chrysippus for nominalism is that the postulation of universals leads to a contradiction. It is a reductio ad absurdum of realism. The contradiction arises from the combination of two theses that, according to Chrysippus, are present in realist theories of universals: ‘nothing can be in two different places at the same time’ and ‘every universal must be present in its instances’. His argument, however, is directed not against realism in general, but against specific theories, namely, theories of immanent forms such as those of Eudoxus and Aristotle. Finally, there are two versions of the Nobody argument, one by Chrysippus and one from the Megarian school. But contrary to what scholars have assumed, the Megarian Nobody argument is not the argument by Stilpo against forms (fr. 199 Döring).