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en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
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Fe de erratas Revista Rivar, volumen 10 número 28.

Mainstream accounts of conceptual norms depict them as a specific kind of (sub)norms in as much as they establish a certain equivalence without making reference to an action-type, which implies also that they lack a deontic modalization. However, such non-prescriptive explanation raises some serious problems, mainly when it is assumed that the introduction of a conceptual norm into a normative system changes the content of the system. Those problems pave the way to contrast such explanation with a prescriptive alternative according to which conceptual norms are regulative in character, though with the peculiarity of addressing the mental action of qualifying something in accordance with a given equivalence. All-things-considered, from such contrast it seems to follow that the prescriptive explanation is less problematic than the non-prescriptive one.

Principle of efficacy and rule of law. Observations about their relationship The purpose of this work is to explore the relationship between the principle of efficacy and the rule of law as formal legality. A substantial part of the work is dedicated to reconstructing the foundation attributed to each notion in the prevailing legal theories and how they are related to the concept of law and the existence of legal systems This examination shows that the formal legality and the principle of effectiveness share the same foundation, which allows establishing certain relationships between them. The main results of this analysis are two. First, there is no unanimous determination about the relationship between the principle of efficacy and the rule of law as a legal formality with the concept of law and with the conditions of existence of legal systems. Second, two of the most influential positions in the literature on the relationship between both notions, present in the works of M. Kramer and J. Raz, have significant problems.

The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation in the Constitutionalised Legal Systems. Theoretical and Empirical Critiques This essay aims to critically examine the so-called communication theory of legal interpretation. Such theory, which is very widespread, claims that there is no relevant difference between ordinary conversation and legal interpretation, since both are ways of understanding an intentional communication. In particular, according to this theory, just as the content of an ordinary conversation is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intention, so the content of law is determined by the legislators’ communicative intentions. After briefly introducing the communication theory and the reasons behind it (§2), I will examine the theoretical criticisms that have been raised against it (§3), how its proponents react to those criticisms by modifying some elements of the theory, and whether such adjustments are sufficient to overcome the criticisms (§4). Then I will formulate an empirical critique against the communication theory in its various versions. I will argue that this theory is false –it does not provide a true description of legal interpretative practice– with respect to some legal systems –the constitutionalised legal systems (§5). Finally, I will briefly mention the consequences that the falsity of this theory yields with respect to some essential values of democratic states (§6).

Judicial Ruling, Evidence and Error The Role of the Truth of Factual Premises in the Application of Legal Rules and in the Justification of Judicial Decisions This paper explores the role that the truth of factual statements plays in applying legal norms and in the justification of judicial decisions. It is argued that the truth of the factual premise is irrelevant regarding an «inferentialist» interpretation of the concept of application of legal norms and that it is also unrelated to the internal justification of judicial decisions. Then it is also argued that the truth of the factual premise is neither a necessary condition for different dimensions of external justification. In short: the truth of the factual premise is not a necessary condition for the justification of the judicial decision in any plausible sense in which such a justification can be evaluated. This does not mean, however, that the truth of that premise is irrelevant tout court.

This study aims to bring together the destructive and constructive dimension of the critical approach vis-à-vis human rights. As such it aims on one hand to reformulate aspects of the critique of the critical legal and political scholarship, whilst attempting to not give up the language of rights entirely to mainstream liberal discourse. What this paper argues is that the language or rights encompasses the regulatory idea of social transformation against structures of domination that should be in the forefront of any critical legal and political debate. Alongside the reformulation of some aspects of the ‘destructive’ dimension of critical thought, this study aims to bring forward a proposition that based on the original problematization of French philosopher Étienne Balibar attempts to offer an alternative view that goes past the current fragmentation of human rights and most importantly the distinction between freedom and equality. The concept of equaliberty rejects the separation between freedom and equality, the separation between the legal and the real, as well as the confusion between the two forms of property and the two forms of solidarity. The present study’s constructive dimension lies with the examination of the implications for law and politics that the introduction of the concept of equaliberty can bring about for the way we discuss human rights today.

Law and Literature in a Philosophical-Legal Perspective Already Jakob Grimm knew that “Law and Literature rise from the same bed”. They are indeed closely connected and influence each other: law can be understood as a form of literature, when we analyze its texture, take it as a narration or consider the style of lawyers. We find many legal aspects in literature, most prominently in Kafka, but also in Thomas Bernhard, who considered “the whole world to be an enormous jurisprudence”. Furthermore, we cannot only speak of law in literature, but in a more practical way of literature in law, e.g. when courts decide about the fictional character of novels. Finally, literature may achieve a kind of justice law may not. This broader normative context of law and literature is covered by “poetic justice”. Law and literature then is an interdisciplinary project that analyzes the cultural embeddedness of law.

On La Corte Enrique Santiago Petracchi II, by Ignacio Giuffré y Sebastián Linares (eds.). Buenos Aires, Ad-Hoc, 2022, 272 pp. The book “The Court Enrique Santiago Petracchi II” that is reviewed shows the imprint of Chief Justice Enrique Santiago Petracchi at the Argentinean Supreme Court of Justice during his second term that occurred between 2003 and 2006. The Court is studied both from the internal point of view, with its reforms in search of transparency and legitimacy, as well as from the external, contextual point of view and relationship with the rest of the State branches and civil society. The account includes a mention of the leading cases of that period and explains how the figure of Petracchi is central to understanding this moment of the Court.

Unwanted sexualized comments: Between Street Harassment, Compliments and Objectification Unwanted sexualized comments, generally called “street harassment”, “cat calling”, or, in Spanish-speaking societies, “compliments”, raise many questions, especially of the legal, sociological, and moral kind. In this article, I will concentrate on the moral valuation of the phenomenon. I will present three possible attitudes towards expressions of sexual attraction in public spaces: one positive, one neutral and one negative. I shall argue in favor of the third attitude, criticizing such manifestations of sexual attraction as morally reprehensible. Besides, I try to show that such a moral view evades the slippery slope argument that blocks any intent to establish contact with another person. On the contrary, I present a criterion to distinguish morally acceptable and moral unacceptable forms of interaction.

Genesis; like the human being and mother earth, the baby and its mother are configured as one being. With the passage of time, these two beings separate to become two individuals in their own right.  This harrowing and terrible episode for the baby can be overcome with the arrival of the transitional object (Winnicott, 1971). In this way, the object becomes indispensable to soothe the sobbing and grief. Once again, the passing of life will bring about a new rupture, this time between the child and the object, and it is precisely this milestone that gives life to our work.  Work that is born from the undercurrent of the unique and profound histories of the objects and, at the same time, belonging to a global world that endows them with universal meanings. Tenderness, affection, joy, sadness, fear or longing are universal emotions and also our own personal ones, which connect us to the objects. Corners and traditions that make us recognise ourselves and guide our behaviour.  Beliefs that condition us and set us free, biographies of life that narrate our journey. The work we present here, a series of doll-objects, is born of those hidden and secret, sometimes magical, meanings with which they are charged. Through them, we aspire to tell the story of life, that story that speaks of the inherited and familiar attachment that connects us to our origins. We reflect on life's journey towards death, with the need to treasure tradition with devotion to nature, protecting the customs that are our own and identify us. We look at those veiled and traditional taboos, questioning the prejudices that stifle our existence.