Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

There are key concepts in the diversity of sciences (whether sciences: formal, natural, biosocial or social) such as “theory” or “model” that are subject today to extensive epistemological debate, i.e. from the theory of knowledge, and centered on the study of scientific knowledge in particular. Scientists, then, construct and use different notions that actually carry an exhaustive extrascientific debate about their nature. This paper will offer some clarifications and formal proposals of such notions from the philosophy of science of the astrophysicist and philosopher Gustavo Esteban Romero (G. E. Romero). Specifically, some formal definitions of “theory’ and “model” will be tested for current sciences (and other disciplines that can be applied), and these ideas will be contextualized in the debate on the structure and organization of scientific knowledge.

The main objective of this article is to give a brief walkthrough of structural realism in Biology. We particularly aim to present the discussion regarding the role of this form of realism in evolutionary biology. We begin by laying out the main motivations to accept the Structural realism thesis. The original structural realist thesis has an emphasis on mathematical equations, which are not usually found in evolutionary biology. To tackle this, we present French’s proposal to adjust structural realism for evolutionary biology. We then introduce some of the main arguments that have been put forward against the position and briefly review some responses. Finally, we mention some general problems that structural realism needs to address in order to become a viable proposal.

This paper presents some comparations and differences between Husserl’s thoughts about philosophy of science and the semantic view of scientific theories. This last conception affirms that empirical theories do not describe the world as it is, but that they represent it using models. However, according to Husserl, an essential part of a theory’s reconstruction is the mathematical description of its domain, that is, the world (or the part of the world) the theory intends to talk about but evoking its origin in the life-world.

This paper discusses the methodology of mathematical philosophy and argues for a methodological pluralism of formal and mathematical methods. It is briefly presented how other types of philosophy do not fulfill what mathematized philosophy does, i.e. a rigor for clarity, objectivity and inter-disciplinary success. Several examples of mathematized philosophy are mentioned, and an example of epistemic utility theory is given. A case is made for an interdisciplinary approach and a unified science in connection with philosophy.  

In this review of A Structuralist Theory of Economics by Adolfo Garc ́ıa de la Sienra, the contributions of this book to economic methodology are discussed.