Sistema Regional de Información
en línea para Revistas Científicas de América Latina,
el Caribe, España y Portugal

The recent health crisis has once again brought to the forefront the relevance of biomedical research, not only for the scientific world, but also for society in general. A thorough understanding of the criteria governing the practice of this discipline -especially in its ethical and legal dimensionscan contribute to the growing development of this type of research. This article aims to offer an approach to the legal framework in force, in relation to those provisions that regulate the participation of persons who cannot express their consent, among which are mainly those who suffer from mental and intellectual disabilities. In this sense, we seek to offer a harmonic interpretation of the normative precepts that establish criteria for research in this population group, specifically of the provisions of article 28 of law 20.584, considering that a literal exegesis of the norm could lead to the absolute exclusion of adults without capacity to consent, who are suffering from an acute and reversible health condition.

The ownership of the right to honor -more properly speaking, prestige, reputation- of legal entities has been admitted by Chilean civil doctrine and jurisprudence, as well as the fact that they may experience moral damage. An area of civil protection not addressed by this civil doctrine has fallen on lawsuits where the affectation to the right to honor of fictitious entities has originated from a journalistic report broadcast by a media. In this article we will address some singularities that exist with respect to the still scarce jurisprudence on civil actions in this area, on the applicable legal status and also with respect to some issues not yet pacified in Chilean tort law, such as the compensation of moral damages of such subjects of law.

The present study focuses on the figure of gig workers in digital platforms such as Uber or Deliveroo and the necessity for a specific regulation that adjusts to the particularities of these new work relations. The above to prevent the lack of certainty regarding their legal status. Following how courts and tribunals in the UK (common law) have sought to redefine and adequate the concept of subordination and dependence, this work seeks to analyse how those elements have been interpreted to apply or not the regulation of the traditional employment figure to the new work relations that digital platforms have created. These most recent decisions demonstrate that this is not a settled topic. The current tools available to judges are insufficient to provide either certainty or security to gig workers, as this new form of labour relations does not fully present the traditional characteristics of subordination and dependence. However, they also demonstrate the need for effective regulation that responds to the demands and interests of these new workers so as not to discourage the creation of new sources of employment by regulating essential aspects such as social and health security.

The purpose of this article is to explore the way in which the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands and founder of the Free University of Amsterdam, Abraham Kuyper, conceived some of the foundations of the political order, such as the concept of sovereignty, the role of the state, of intermediate groups and that of property. Kuyper, an author practically unknown in Ibero-America, but highly influential in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, reflected on issues of primary importance for the political life of any nation, and that today seem be being reformulated. Also, in each of the points we will try to establish parallels with the teachings of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, in order to show the similarities between both traditions of social thought.

In this investigation, the formulation of the theory of omission as a vice of unconstitutionality is analyzed, and its interaction with the neo-constitutionalist paradigm. For that, the formulation of the theory of unconstitutional omission and its requirements is analyzed in the first place, to then address the analysis of the fundamental elements of the neo-constitutionalist theory. Then it is concluded through a critical review of the consequences that the adoption of the theory of omission as a vice of unconstitutionality could imply if it were faced from the neoconstitutional paradigm.

The article offers a systematic reconstruction of Collusion’s Criminal unjust, art. 62 DL. 211, from the theory of norms and the accessory nature of criminal law. For that, it analyzes the administrative norm content of art. 3 of the DL. 211 and the selection of criminal law behaviors and their particularities.

The alienability supposal when referring to the lien of a defendant’s share does not apply in private companies, because the power of disposition of this right it is subjected to a third party resolution. This is the hypothesis of article 404, paragraph 3 from the “Código de Comercio/Commerce Code” and article 2088 from the “Código Civil/ Civil Code”, which establish that the assignment of company interests on private companies is null without the approval of all the shareholders. This requirement affects the judge and prevents the company interests to be mandatorily transferred in the execution proceeding, since the law requires its assignment to a condition that cannot be fulfilled by any of the alienating means that take part of the enforcement, making it, as a result, inalienable in the execution proceeding.

Roman law shows, from its origins, an obvious propensity for universality. That is clearly manifested, at the ‘foundation’ of the system, in the Constitutions with which Justinian accompanies the launching of the CJC, but it undoubtedly goes back to the age of Romans’ identification of ius gentium, at the basis of which we find the naturalis ratio. Statual-legalism has not been able to cut off this umbilical cord with Roman law and with the natural reason. Roman law, in force even though no longer effective, is the driving force behind modern codifications, and must be cherished by modern jurists as a common heritage of humanity. The preservation of its values, which revolve around the centrality of the human person (bona fides, aequitas, libertas, voluntas, etc.) represents the challenge that all of us, as jurists, must be capable of taking up.

The author provides some reflections about the concept of innovation in education and makes a case for set up significant differences: innovation is neither upgrading, nor entertainment, nor exhibitionism in social networks. Educative Innovation is related to the meaning of the actions that teachers, individually or collectively, put into practice in a specified training context so that their students have the chance to learn more and better. From this perspective, the means will always be subordinate to the purposes. Understanding innovation as a continuous process of searching for possible alternatives to respond to the educational needs of students is a position connected to the professional development of teachers, not to the acquisition of instrumental knowledge about the functioning and use of the most advanced technological devices.

To understand Camus we must listen to his voice, let him speak in his texts. In them he speaks to us of a common humanity, of a human nature composed of longings for beauty and suffering. He tells us that there is no life without dialogue, and that in most of the world this dialogue has been replaced by polemic, and that war, violence, has educated us, as it did the generation of which he himself was a part. This text tries to think through some of Camus' ideas and to reconsider his thesis that our survival as humanity depends on keeping a kind of inner fire burning, which is made up of the stories we tell ourselves, of the books we can continue to read with others, in short, of a culture placed at the service of our common humanity. Those stories, those books, that culture which today, as we are well aware, no longer occupy a prominent place in our universities. Unfortunately.